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ABSTRACT
To fly aircraft under all (adverse) conditions, pilots must rely fully on the data
presented to them, and on the reliable and timely forwarding of their commands to relevant
aircraft subsystems. The avionics application, Flight Control Display Module (FCDM),
connects these subsystems with the aircraft flight deck by means of modern digital data
buses. It combines, controls, processes and forwards the data between the subsystems and
the flight deck. High reliability of these functions is required to ensure the safety of
the aircraft. The experiences with the software development methods to meet these
requirements are presented.
For air transport the safety requirements are stated in DO-178b: software considerations in
airborne systems and equipment certification. The main part of the FCDM software is subject
to the most severe classification of DA-178B. Compliance to DA-178B is assessed by an
independent, government authorised, third party. This third party issues a certificate
releasing the product for operational use. The influence of these safety requirements and
the independent DO-178B compliance assessment on the software development and verification
methods are described. The black box has a successful application in air transport. The
extension of the black box approach in FCDM is discussed.
The development of aircraft is a commercial venture. In order to meet the market demands,
permanent changes occur during the sofware development proces. Many different versions of
and/or extensions to the product for the various customers are required. The reliability,
maintainability, safety and certifiability of the product may not be compromised. The
impact of all these customisations on the development and verification methods is assessed.
General standards for safety critical software are emerging. Some differences and
similarities with DO-178B are highlighted. These standards provide opportunities for
general purpose products. Their possible impact on airworthy equipment is assessed using
the FCDM case.
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Abstract
To fly aircraft under all (adverse) conditions, pilots must rely fully on the data presented to
them, and on the reliable and timely forwarding of their commands to the relevant aircraft
subsystems. The avionics application, Flight Control Display Module (FCDM), connects these
subsystems with the aircraft flight deck by means of modern digital data buses. It combines,
controls, processes and forwards the data between the subsystems and the flight deck. High
reliability of these functions is required to ensure the safety of the aircraft. The experiences with
the software development methods to meet these requirements are presented.
For air transport the safety requirements are stated in DO-178B: software considerations in
airborne systems and equipment certification. The main part of the FCDM software is subject
to the most severe classification of DO-178B. Compliance to DO-178B is assessed by an
independent, government authorised, third party. This third party issues a certificate releasing
the product for operational use. The influence of these safety requirements and the independent
DO-178B compliance assessment on the software development and verification methods are
described. The black box has a successful application in air transport. The extension of the black
box approach in FCDM is discussed.
The development of aircraft is a commercial venture. In order to meet the market demands,
permanent changes occur during the software development process. Many different versions of
and/or extensions to the product for the various customers are required. The reliability,
maintainability, safety and certifiability of the product may not be compromised. The impact of
all these customisations on the development and verification methods is assessed.
General standards for safety critical software are emerging. Some differences and similarities
with DO-178B are highlighted. These standards provide opportunities for general purpose
products. Their possible impact on airworthy equipment is assessed using the FCDM case.
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1 Introduction
To fly aircraft under all (adverse) conditions, pilots must rely fully on the data presented to
them, and on the reliable and timely forwarding of their commands to the relevant aircraft
subsystems. An avionics application which is currently being developed by NLR, the Flight
Control Display Module (FCDM), connects these subsystems with the aircraft flight deck by
means of modern digital data buses. It combines, controls, processes and forwards the data
between the subsystems and the flight deck. High reliability of these functions is required to
ensure the safety of the aircraft. In this paper the experience with the software development
methods to meet these requirements in a commercial environment are presented. The final
section highlights some differences and similarities between the emerging general standards for
safety critical software.
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2 Air transport software safety requirements
For air transport, apart from the normal customer-supplier relation relating to the functional
requirements, the safety requirements are stated in DO-178B: software considerations in airborne
systems and equipment certification [ref 1]. The aim of this document is to provide guidance to
both the software developers and the certification authorities. Usually acceptance of software is
based on an agreement between the developer and the customer. In civil avionics an independent
third party, the certification authority, performs the ultimate system (aircraft) acceptance by
certifying the aircraft. It is only then that the software is airworthy and can be considered ready
for use in the aircraft concerned. DO-178B provides a world wide "level playing field" for the
competing industries as well as a world wide protection of the air traveler, which are important
due to the international character of the industry. The certification authority is a national
governmental institution which in our case delegated some of its technical activities to a
specialised company.
Based on the impact of the system failure the software failure can contribute to, the software is
classified into 5 levels. The following is a verbatim copy of the DO-178B text. The failure
probability in flight hours (i.e. actual operating hours) according to the Federal Aviation
Requirements/Joint Aviation Requirements FAR/JAR-25 [ref 2] has been added.
Level A: Catastrophic failure
Failure conditions which would prevent continued safe flight and landing
FAR/JAR-25 extremely improbable, < 1x10-9
Level B: Hazardous/Severe-Major
Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew
to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be:
- a large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities
- physical distress or higher workload such that the flight crew could not be relied on to
perform their tasks accurately or completely
- adverse effect on occupants including serious or potentially fatal injuries to a small
number of those occupants
FAR/JAR-25 extremely remote, 1x10-9 < hazardous failure < 1x10-7
Level C: Major
Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew
to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example,
- a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities
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- a significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency or
- discomfort to occupants, possibly including injuries
FAR/JAR-25 remote, 1x10-7 < major failure < 1x10-5
Level D: Minor
Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce aircraft safety and which would
involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions may
include for example,
- a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities
- a slight increase in crew workload, such as, routine flight plan changes, or
- some inconvenience to occupants
FAR/JAR-25 probable, minor failure > 1x10-5
Level E: No Effect
Failure conditions which do not affect the operational capability of the aircraft or increase
crew workload.
The following text will only consider the part of the application which is classified as level A.
DO-178B on purpose refrains from making a statement about an appropriate software life cycle.
The life cycle is described rather abstract as a number of processes that are categorised as
follows:
- software planning process
The software planning process entails the production of the following documents
- Plan for Software Aspects of Certification. The main purpose of this document is to define
the compliance of the software development process to DO-178B for the certification
authorities. This document contains many references to the project documentation
generated as part of the life cycle model used.
- Software development plan, which defines the chosen software life cycle and the software
development environment, including all tools used
- software verification plan, which defines the means by which the verification objectives
will be met
- Software configuration management plan and software quality assurance plan
- software development processes consisting of
- software requirement process
- software design process
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- software coding process
- integration process
Each software development process has to be traceable, verifiable and consistent.
Transition criteria need to be defined by the developer to determine whether the next process
may be started. In case the inputs of a process are incomplete, e.g. the previous process has
not been completed, transition can be allowed when the transition criteria are satisfied.
Special attention needs to be paid to the verification of process inputs which become
available after the subsequent process is started.
- integral processes
The integral processes are divided into
- software verification process
- software configuration management process
- software quality assurance process
- certification liaison process
The integral processes are a result of the criticality of the software. Consequently the integral
processes are performed concurrently with the software development processes throughout the
entire software life cycle.
Verification is defined as "the evaluation of the results of a process to ensure correctness and
consistency with respect to the inputs and standards to that process". Verification can be
accomplished by review, analysis, test or any combination of these 3 activities. Review provides
a qualitative assessment of correctness. Analysis is a detailed examination of a software
component. It is a repeatable process that can be supported by tools. DO-178B recognises two
types of tool
- software development tools, which can introduce errors
- software verification tools, which can fail to detect errors.
The FCDM project has only developed software verification tools. Every tool needs to be
verified against the Tool Operational Requirements (TOR), the contents of which is prescribed
in DO-178B. Software development tools need to be tested using normal and abnormal
conditions. Software verification tools need only be tested using normal conditions. For software
tools the same documentation and configuration control procedures apply as for the airborne
software. Every software tool needs approval of the certification authority. Testing is "the
process of exercising a system or system components to verify that it satisfies specified
requirements and to detect errors". By definition the actual testing of deliverable software forms
only part of the verification of the coding and integration processes.
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3 Experience gained with safety critical software development
Usually the software development process is agreed between the customer and the supplier. For
certifiable software a third party is involved, adding a stage in the approval process. The
organisational independence improves the position of the assessors. In the our case the customer
had ample experience with DO-178B certification and decided, after approving the process
documentation, to postpone the review with the certification authorities until the completion of
the coding process. Only minor modifications were needed in the process documents, implying
that DO-178B can be adhered to without prior knowledge of certification.
The project team was set up consisting of 2 separate groups, a development group and a
verification group. The verification group was headed by a team member with sufficient
authority to report, at his own discretion, to the company management outside of the project
hierarchy.
To ensure a strict traceability from requirements to design, to code and to integration a review
was planned after completion of each process. Experience with previous mission critical software
development suggested variability of detailed system requirements, so analysis is used wherever
possible. Part of the analysis can be strictly defined and subsequently implemented in a
customised tool. Tool support reduces the costs for repeated analysis. The software verification
tools performed according to expectations to reduce the impact (both in time and costs) of the
many late requirements changes.
The customer required use of the C programming language was considered a potential risk for
the successful application development. The C language contains numerous constructs that are
unspecified, undefined or left to be defined by the compiler supplier [ref 3] This risk was
reduced by choosing an ANSI-C compliant compiler complemented by a project coding standard
defining, amongst others, a safe subset of C. Compliance to this project coding standard can be
checked automatically by customising a commercial tool. During verification of this tool the
version management by the tool supplier turned out to be inadequate. The tool was already sold
at least 5 years to hundreds of customers. This illustrates the rigour of the applied verification
processes.
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4 Overview of the avionics application
The flight display subsystem is designed to operate in both Visual Meteorological Conditions
(VMC) and Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). Under visual meteorological conditions
the displays aid the pilot during flight, under instrument meteorological conditions the
instruments are necessary for the pilot to be able to fly, consequently the correct functioning of
the instruments is safety critical. The latter conditions imply that a number of equipment items
needs to be duplicated to achieve the required failure probability.
When configured for instrument meteorological conditions the display subsystem consists of the
following equipment:
- 2 Flight Control Display Modules,
- 4 Smart Multifunction Displays,
- 2 Instrument Control Panels,
- 1 Reconfiguration Control Unit.
Fig. 1 Overview flight control display module environment
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The FCDM is the interface between the on-board sensors and the displays. The sensors and some
aircraft subsystems send flight parameters via digital buses to the FCDM, which validates the
parameters and sends them to the displays. A number of parameters is also computed within
FCDM itself.
In case of failure of an equipment item or a discrepancy between two sensors, the
Reconfiguration Control Unit permits the crew to choose between different configurations. When
a sensor is reconfigured, it is logically switched-off. This illustrates how software and a
multiplied hardware device reduce the failure rate to to the required level. Consequently the
software becomes safety critical.
During normal operation FCDM processes about 100 different flight parameters, coming from
10 different sensors. Each parameter is classified as:
- critical: loss or undetected error could lead to a catastrophic failure condition. Examples of
critical parameters are the attitude parameters: pitch, roll, and heading. The software that
handles these parameters is classified as level A.
- essential: loss or undetected error could lead to a major failure condition. An example of an
essential parameter is the VOR (VHF Omnibearing Range for position determination). The
software that handles these parameters is classified as level B.
- non-essential: loss or undetected error could lead to a minor failure condition. Examples of
these parameters are the long term navigation parameters, like the flight plan. The software
that handles these parameters is classified as level D.
Depending on the criticality of the data, validation is performed in four different ways:
- coherency test: a check on correct length and parity of the data,
- reception test: a check on the timely arrival of the data,
- sensor discrepancy test: a comparison between two parameters produced by the two
independent redundant sensors,
- module discrepancy test: a comparison between two parameter values produced by the same
sensor; one value directly read by FCDM from the sensor, and one obtained from the
redundant FCDM via a cross-talk bus.
FCDM itself does not have a black box capability. However, since FCDM is a spider in the web
of the avionics subsystems, it is made responsible for monitoring the health of these subsystems.
Any discrepancy between multiplied equipment and abnormal behaviour is logged into
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non-volatile FCDM memory and also send to the on-board maintenance device. The logged
errors can be downloaded from FCDM during on-ground maintenance. This log allows an early
warning system to prevent possible future malfunctions leading to accidents.
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5 Experience gained with safety critical software development methods
The definition of the FCDM software development method has been guided by previous
experience with mission critical software. In spacecraft the software on which success of a
mission depends is classified as mission critical. The Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS)
software for the Italian- Dutch SAX (Astronomical X-ray Satellite) [ref 4] has been developed
using the following software development method
- customer supplied specifications provided in plain English
- use of ESA PSS-05 life cycle model [ref 5]
- software analysis using Structured Analysis with Hatley and Pirbhai Real Time extensions
(SA/RT) supported by the Teamwork tool. The process-specifications are written in plain
English, including a copy of the relevant requirement number(s)
- software design using Yourdon Structured Design (SD) supported by the Teamwork tool. The
module-specifications are written in pseudo code and include a copy of the relevant
requirement number(s)
- coding in the customer prescribed C-language. A proprietary C-coding standard was used,
enhanced for this specific project. The entire module-specification was included as comment
in the code
- module testing and integration testing with a self imposed 100% code coverage requirement.
After validation and delivery the resulting system contained 1 error in 20,000 lines of
non-comment source-code. This error was found during the SAX satellite integration tests plus
the entire operational life of the satellite. The resulting error density is 0.05 error per 1,000 lines
of code. This can be categorised as an extremely low value, refer also to [ref 6]. This error
density was achieved even though the first delivery consisted of 16,000 lines of code and
subsequently about 8,000 lines of code were added/modified resulting in a total size of 20,000
lines of code.
For FCDM the customer prescribed the use of the DOD-STD-2167A [ref 7] life cycle model and
the use of the C-language.
Based on the successful SAX AOCS development the following elements of the SAX AOCS
software development method are retained
- customer supplied specifications provided in plain English
- software analysis using Structured Analysis/Real Time supported by the Teamwork tool
- software design using structured design supported by the Teamwork tool
- use of NLR proprietary C-coding standard, with project specific enhancements
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Based on the SAX-AOCS experience of a very substantial amount of changes during and after
the implementation phase, even more emphasis is placed on tools to support the development
activities. Added to the software development method are
- automated test tool to aid the construction and cost effective repetition of module tests and
as many of the integration tests as practical
- a mandatory 100% code coverage for level A software. This code coverage consists of
statement coverage (every statement executed) plus decision coverage (every decision
executed for pass and fail) plus the modified condition/decision coverage (mc/dc). Mc/dc
requires that for every operator in an expression, its independent effect on the outcome of the
expression is demonstrated
- execution of all module tests and the integration tests on the target system with a hardware
emulator with instrumented code. Subsequently repetition of all these tests with
non-instrumented code to check whether the same results are obtained as with the
instrumented code. An emulator considerably expedites the analysis of unexpected results.
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6 Commercial realities versus safety critical application development
Due to the commercially defined short time to market, the customer definition of the system
requirements was performed concurrently with the software requirements process. The resulting
analysis was subjected to a number of informal technical assessments, but no formal verification
was performed.
The commercial nature of the aircraft development even resulted in concurrent updates of the
system requirements during the design, coding and integration processes. Consequently the
planned deployment of separate development and integration teams turned out to be infeasible.
To aid the integration of the FCDM in the customer developed displays and subsequently in the
existing aircraft, a first version of the software with very limited functionality was delivered.
This version was produced based on a successive completion of the documented software
development processes. However none of the formal reviews with the customer or the
certification authority had been performed. The first version served its purpose well. A lot of
feed-back was obtained, resulting in many changes to and clarifications of the system
requirements.
Due to the success in eliminating system level problems by the informal co-development of the
first version of the FCDM and the displays, the customer requested to continue the informal
co-development and allocate all project resources to it. The personnel resources of both teams
were combined, however the 2 separate team managers with their complementary responsibilities
remained. All activities were executed for only one of the teams. The respective team leader
ensured that the relevant procedures are strictly enforced.
From a functional point of view this concentrated development effort resulting in 4 pre-releases
of the software, has been very successful. Up to date the software contains nearly all functions
while at the same time around 150 changes to the system requirements have been
accommodated. Valuable feed back from the user (pilot) has been obtained. Also the
development of the displays and especially its integration with FCDM and the aircraft have been
expedited considerably.
This informal co-development has only been possible because the documented software
requirement process and software design process had been completed before the coding of the
first software version started. The available Teamwork models also aided in assessing the
consequences of proposed changes. The drawback of the informal co-development is that a very
considerable amount of documentation work remains, as based on the software size it was
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impossible to enlarge the team. Also all verification and the exhaustive mc/dc testing still needs
to be performed. It is inevitable that the verification will result in a new version of the software,
which will be submitted to the certification authorities. The reverse side of the early and
successful delivery of the co-development versions is the risk of the invalidating some already
completed flight trials of the aircraft.
An important lesson learned from the informal co-development is to try to keep the verification
process up with the actual implementation to comply with the commercial time to market. The
many system requirement changes require a cheap and easily repeatable verification process. This
can only be achieved by using strictly defined development methods which allow strictly defined
analysis. The well defined analysis should be executed by automated tools. These tools should
be sufficiently user-friendly and efficient to allow the analysis, design and testing to be updated
concurrently with the code modifications resulting in a spiral development model. As a complete
integrated suite of development tools is not commercially available, the best option is to use as
much available tools as possible. For some simple unsupported (verification) tasks proprietary
tools can be produced cost-effectively. Only the tool for checking compliance to the coding
standard was sufficiently user-friendly to be used during the co-development. The Teamwork
tool is too labour intensive to keep the analysis and design up to date.
Independent personnel is required for the verification of the coding and integration processes.
This requirement combined with the outdated status of the analysis and design, means that the
verification can not keep up with the co-development. After the last pre-release delivery costly
re-work needs to be done, which also delays the certification schedule. It is unclear how much
of the schedule time gained during the co-development is lost due to the resulting delay of the
certification. At least co-development saves re-certification effort as well as the generation of
much documentation describing pre-releases.
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7 Comparison of standards for safety critical systems
This section will highlight some differences between several standards for safety critical systems,
based on the avionics application experience.
DO-178B has been specifically constructed for airborne systems and pre-dates the other
standards. Currently other standards for safety critical systems are available, ISO/DIS 15026
[ref 8] and IEC 1508 [ref 9]. Like DO-178B also ISO/DIS 15026 recognises an "integrity
assurance authority" besides the customer and supplier. This authority issues a certificate of
compliance. The number of software integrity levels and their criteria are to be negotiated with
the integrity assurance authority. As an example the IEC 300-3-9 [ref 10] is included in the
standard. JAR/FAR-25 requires a catastrophic failure to occur less then once during 10-9 flight
hours. IEC 300-3-9 classifies a system exhibiting a failure with catastrophic consequence and
an incredible frequency (defined at < 10-6 per year, which at a commercial utilisation rate of
1000 flight hours per year for the aircraft involved, equals 10-9 per flight hour) only as
intermediate. Like DO-178B ISO/DIS 15026 does not recommend a life cycle. An example life
cycle with methods to achieve confidence are included. This example life cycle defines 8 phases
based on the waterfall model and consequently does not accommodate the commercial necessities
of co-development and short time to market.
IEC 1508 classifies the failure frequency in 4 levels, the most severe allowing between 10-6 and
10-4 dangerous failures per year. This is more frequent then DO-178B combined with
JAR/FAR-25. IEC 1508 declares itself unapplicable for lower failure rates. IEC 1508 defines a
safety life cycle with 16 phases which include modifications after delivery, retrofit and
decommissioning. The inputs and outputs per phase are specified. Highly recommended
techniques are prescribed. Not using these requires a mandatory justification. As a minimum
ISO 9000 quality assurance is required. Although the need for iteration is mentioned, the
software life cycles and the recommended techniques do not seem to accommodate this
commercial necessity. DO-178B is based on independent execution of the verification by the
supplier combined with the organisationally independent certification authority. IEC 1508
prescribes the independence of the assessors per safety level for a number of activities. The
options are independent person, independent department and independent organisation. For
systems with the highest integrity level IEC 1508 states a structured method supported by a tool
as "highly recommended". C is classified as "positively not recommended" and IEC 1508 is
impartial for C with subset and coding standard.
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The emergence of these standards means market opportunities for tools which support the
development of safety critical systems. This may benefit the development of safety safety critical
systems in various ways:
- tools may be qualified once by the vendor, reducing considerable project qualification effort,
- tool checks may become more comprehensive reducing (re-)verification effort,
- tool operations may improve allowing to support the commercially necessary co-development,
- commercial tools should significantly lower the effort needed to produce safety critical
systems and hence their price, making those systems affordable for many more applications.
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8 Conclusion
For software development in air transport the safety requirements are stated in DO-178B. This
document is sufficiently clear to allow a first-time developer to define, without external support,
a compliant development process. This document is used by both software producers and by the
independent certification authority which ensures compliance. Developing software according
to the traditional waterfall model allows compliance to be achieved.
Producing aircraft is a commercial venture which means that the various aircraft subsystems need
to be co-developed in order to achieve the commercially determined time to market. The spiral
model is more appropriate then the waterfall model. An integrated tool set is needed which
supports the co-development i.e. which allows when a change occurs to concurrently update
analysis, design, code, integration and verification (including traceability information). Currently
available tools do not provide this capability. To minimise the effort of the recurring verification,
analysis is the preferred method, supported by tools wherever available. For simple verification
tasks customised tools can be developed cost-effectively. Emerging general purpose safety
standards suggest that safety critical systems will also have to be build for other application
areas. This could make the required tools commercially attractive for tool vendors, which in turn,
could reduce the costs associated with safety critical system development.
The need to deploy all human resources to development has significantly reduced the
development time as well as allowed co-development of the avionics application with several
other aircraft subsystems. It can not be assessed whether this time reduction is offset by the
resulting delay in updating the documentation and certification. By performing these iterations
before certification at least the re-certification costs of the intermediate versions have been
avoided.
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